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Abstract
When we enforce differential privacy in machine
learning, the utility-privacy trade-off is different
w.r.t. each group. Gradient clipping and random
noise addition disproportionately affect underrep-
resented and complex classes and subgroups, which
results in inequality in utility loss. In this work, we
analyze the inequality in utility loss by differential
privacy and propose a modified differentially pri-
vate stochastic gradient descent (DPSGD), called
DPSGD-F, to remove the potential disparate im-
pact of differential privacy on the protected group.
DPSGD-F adjusts the contribution of samples in a
group depending on the group clipping bias such
that differential privacy has no disparate impact on
group utility. Our experimental evaluation shows
how group sample size and group clipping bias af-
fect the impact of differential privacy in DPSGD,
and how adaptive clipping for each group helps to
mitigate the disparate impact caused by differential
privacy in DPSGD-F.
1 Introduction
Most researches on fairness-aware machine learning study
whether the predictive decision made by machine learn-
ing model is discriminatory against the protected group
[Kamishima et al., 2011; Zafar et al., 2017; Kamiran et al.,
2010; Hardt et al., 2016; Zhang et al., 2018; Madras et al.,
2018]. For example, demographic parity requires that a pre-
diction is independent of the protected attribute. Equality of
odds [Hardt et al., 2016] requires that a prediction is inde-
pendent of the protected attribute conditional on the origi-
nal outcome. These fairness notions focus on achieving non-
discrimination within one single model. In addition to the
within-model fairness, cross-model fairness also arises in dif-
ferential privacy preserving machine learning models when
we compare the accuracy loss incurred by private model be-
tween the majority group and the protected group. Recently,
research in [Bagdasaryan et al., 2019] shows that the reduc-
tion in accuracy incurred by deep private models dispropor-
tionately impacts underrepresented subgroups. The unfair-
ness in this cross-model scenario is that the reduction in ac-
curacy due to privacy protection is discriminatory against the
protected group.
In this paper, we study the inequality in utility loss due to
differential privacy w.r.t. groups, which compares the change
in prediction accuracy w.r.t. each group between the private
model and the non-private model. Differential privacy guar-
antees the query results or the released model cannot be ex-
ploited by attackers to derive whether one particular record
is present or absent in the underlying dataset [Dwork et al.,
2006]. When we enforce differential privacy onto a regular
non-private model, the model trades some utility off for pri-
vacy. On one hand, with the impact of differential privacy, the
within-model unfairness in the private model may be different
from the one in the non-private model [Jagielski et al., 2019;
Xu et al., 2019; Ding et al., 2020; Cummings et al., 2019]. On
the other hand, differential privacy may introduce additional
discriminative effect towards the protected group when we
compare the private model with the non-private model. The
utility loss between the private and non-private models w.r.t.
each group, such as reduction in group accuracy, may be un-
even. The intention of differential privacy should not be to
introduce more accuracy loss on the protected group regard-
less of the level of within-model unfairness in the non-private
model.
There are several empirical studies on the relation between
the utility loss due to differential privacy and groups with dif-
ferent represented sample sizes. Research in [Bagdasaryan et
al., 2019] shows that the accuracy of private models tends to
decrease more on classes that already have lower accuracy in
the original, non-private model. In their case, the direction of
inequality in utility loss due to differential privacy is the same
as the existing within-model discrimination against the un-
derrepresented group in the non-private model, i.e. “the poor
become poorer”. Research in [Du et al., 2019] shows the sim-
ilar observation that the contribution of rare training examples
is hidden by random noise in differentially private stochastic
gradient descent, and that random noise slows down the con-
vergence of the learning algorithm. Research in [Jaiswal and
Provost, 2019] shows different observations when they ana-
lyze if the performance on emotion recognition is affected in
an imbalanced way for the models trained to enhance privacy.
They find that while the performance is affected differently
for the subgroups, the effect is not consistent across multiple
setups and datasets. In their case, there is no consistent direc-
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tion of inequality in utility loss by differential privacy against
the underrepresented group. Hence, the impact of differen-
tial privacy on group accuracy is more complicated than the
observation in [Bagdasaryan et al., 2019] (see detailed dis-
cussions in Section 4.1). It needs to be cautionary to conclude
that differential privacy introduces more utility loss on the un-
derrepresented group. The bottom line is that the objective of
differential privacy is to protect individual’s privacy instead
of introducing unfairness in the form of inequality in utility
loss w.r.t. groups. Though the privacy metric increases when
a model is adversarially trained to enhance privacy, we need
to ensure that the performance of the model on that dataset
does not harm one subgroup more than the other.
In this work, we conduct theoretical analysis of the in-
equality in utility loss by differential privacy and propose a
new differentially private mechanism to remove it. We study
the cost of privacy w.r.t. each group in comparison with the
whole population and explain how group sample size is re-
lated to the privacy impact on group accuracy along with
other factors (Section 4.2). The difference in group sample
sizes leads to the difference in average group gradient norms,
which results in different group clipping biases under the uni-
form clipping bound. It costs less utility trade-off to achieve
the same level of differential privacy for the group with larger
group sample size and/or smaller group clipping bias. In other
words, the group with smaller group sample size and/or larger
group clipping bias incurs more utility loss when the algo-
rithm achieves the sample level of differential privacy w.r.t.
each group. Furthermore, we propose a modified differen-
tially private stochastic gradient descent (DPSGD) algorithm,
called DPSGD-F, to remove the potential inequality in utility
loss among groups (Section 5.2). DPSGD-F adjusts the con-
tribution of samples in a group depending on the group clip-
ping bias. For the group with smaller cost of privacy, their
contribution is decreased and the achieved privacy w.r.t. their
group is stronger; and vise versa. As a result, the final utility
loss is the same for each group, i.e. differential privacy has
no disparate impact on group utility in DPSGD-F. Our exper-
imental evaluation shows the effectiveness of our removal al-
gorithm on achieving equal utility loss with satisfactory util-
ity (Section 6).
Our contributions are as follows:
• We provide theoretical analysis on the group level cost
of privacy and show the source of disparate impact
of differential privacy on each group in the original
DPSGD.
• We propose a modified DPSGD algorithm, called
DPSGD-F, to achieve differential privacy with equal
utility loss w.r.t. each group. It uses adaptive clipping
to adjust the sample contribution of each group, so the
privacy level w.r.t. each group is calibrated based on
their cost of privacy. As a result, the final group utility
loss is the same for each group in DPSGD-F.
• In our experimental evaluation, we show how group
sample size and group clipping bias affect the impact of
differential privacy in DPSGD, and how adaptive clip-
ping for each group helps to mitigate the disparate im-
pact caused by differential privacy in DPSGD-F.
2 Related Works
2.1 Differential Privacy
Existing literature in differentially private machine learning
targets both convex and nonconvex optimization algorithms
and can be divided into three main classes, input perturbation,
output perturbation, and inner perturbation. Input perturba-
tion approaches [Duchi et al., 2013] add noise to the input
data based on local differential privacy model. Output per-
turbation approaches [Bassily et al., 2018] add noise to the
model after the training procedure finishes, i.e., without mod-
ifying the training algorithm. Inner perturbation approaches
modify the learning algorithm such that the noise is injected
during learning. For example, research in [Chaudhuri et al.,
2011] modifies the objective of the training procedure and
[Abadi et al., 2016] add noise to the gradient output of each
step of the training without modifying the objective.
Limiting users to small contributions keeps noise level at
the cost of introducing bias. research in [Amin et al., 2019]
characterizes the trade-off between bias and variance, and
shows that (1) a proper bound can be found depending on
properties of the dataset and (2) a concrete cost of privacy
cannot be avoided simpling by collecting more data. Sev-
eral works study how to adaptively bound the contributions of
users and clip the model parameters to improve learning accu-
racy and robustness. Research in [Pichapati et al., 2019] uses
coordinate-wise adaptive clipping of the gradient to achieve
the same privacy guarantee with much less added noise. In
federated learning setting, the proposed approach [Thakkar
et al., 2019] adaptively sets the clipping norm applied to each
user’s update, based on a differentially private estimate of a
target quantile of the distribution of unclipped norms remove
the need for such extensive parameter tuning. Other than
adaptive clipping, research in [Phan et al., 2017] adaptively
injects noise into features based on the contribution of each
to the output so that the utility of deep neural networks under
-differential privacy is improved; [Lee and Kifer, 2018] adap-
tively allocates per-iteration privacy budget to achieve zCDP
on gradient descent.
2.2 Fairness-aware Machine Learning
In the literature, many methods have been proposed to mod-
ify the training data for mitigating biases and achieving fair-
ness. These methods include: Massaging [Kamiran and
Calders, 2009], Reweighting [Calders et al., 2009], Sam-
pling [Kamiran and Calders, 2011], Disparate Impact Re-
moval [Feldman et al., 2015], Causal-based Removal [Zhang
et al., 2017] and Fair Representation Learning [Edwards
and Storkey, 2016; Xie et al., 2017; Madras et al., 2018;
Zhang et al., 2018]. Some researches propose to mitigate dis-
criminative bias in model predictions by adjusting the learn-
ing process [Zafar et al., 2017] or changing the predicted la-
bels [Hardt et al., 2016]. Recent studies [Zhang et al., 2018;
Madras et al., 2018] also use adversarial learning techniques
to achieve fairness in classification and representation learn-
ing.
Reweighting or sampling changes the importance of train-
ing samples according to an estimated probability that they
belong to the protected group so that more importance is
placed on sensitive ones [Calders et al., 2009; Dwork et
al., 2012; Kamiran and Calders, 2011]. Adaptive sensitive
reweighting uses an iterative reweighting process to recog-
nize sources of bias and diminish their impact without affect-
ing features or labels [Krasanakis et al., 2018]. [Kearns et al.,
2018] uses agnostic learning to achieve good accuracy and
fairness on all subgroups. However, it requires a large number
of iterations, thus incurring a very high privacy loss. Other
approaches to balance accuracy across classes include over-
sampling, adversarial training with a loss function that over-
weights the underrepresented group, cost-sensitive learning,
and resampling. These techniques cannot be directly com-
bined with DPSGD because the sensitivity bounds enforced
by DPSGD are not valid for oversampled or overweighted
inputs, i.e. the information used to find optimal balancing
strategy is highly sensitive with unbounded sensitivity.
2.3 Differential Privacy and Fairness
Recent works study the connection between achieving pri-
vacy protection and fairness. Research in [Dwork et al.,
2012] proposed a notion of fairness that is a generalization of
differential privacy. Research in [Hajian et al., 2015] devel-
oped a pattern sanitization method that achieves k-anonymity
and fairness. Most recently, the position paper [Ekstrand et
al., 2018] argued for integrating recent research on fairness
and non-discrimination to socio-technical systems that pro-
vide privacy protection. Later on, several works studied how
to achieve within-model fairness (demographic parity [Xu et
al., 2019; Ding et al., 2020], equality of odds [Jagielski et al.,
2019], equality of opportunity [Cummings et al., 2019]) in
addition to enforcing differential privacy in the private model.
Our work in this paper studies how to prevent disparate im-
pact of the private model on model accuracy across different
groups.
3 Preliminary
Let D be a dataset with n tuples x1, x2, · · · , xn, where each
tuple xi includes the information of a user i on d unpro-
tected attributes A1, A2, · · · , Ad, the protected attribute S,
and the decision Y . Let Dk denote a subset of D with
the set of tuples with S = k. Given an set of examples
D, the non-private model outputs a classifier η(a;w) with
parameter w which minimizes the loss function LD(w) =
1
n
∑n
i=1 Li(w). The optimal model parameter w
∗ is defined
as: w∗ = arg min
w
1
n
∑n
i=1 Li(w). A differentially private al-
gorithm outputs a classifier η˜(a; w˜) by selecting w˜ in a man-
ner that satisfies differential privacy while keeping it close to
the actual optimal w∗.
3.1 Differential Privacy
Differential privacy guarantees output of a query q be insen-
sitive to the presence or absence of one record in a dataset.
Definition 1. Differential privacy [Dwork et al., 2006]. A
mechanism M is (, δ)-differentially private if, for any pair
of datasetsD andD′ that differ in exactly one record, and for
all events O in the output range ofM, we have
Pr(M(D) ∈ O) ≤ exp() · Pr(M(D′) ∈ O) + δ.
Algorithm 1 DPSGD (Dataset D, loss function LD(w),
learning rate r, batch size b, noise scale σ, clipping bound
C)
1: for t ∈ [T ] do
2: Randomly sample a batch of samples Bt(|Bt| = b)
from D
3: for each sample xi ∈ Bt do
4: gi = OLi(wt)
5: end for
6: for each sample xi ∈ Bt do
7: g¯i = gi ×min(1, C|gi| )
8: end for
9: G˜B =
1
b (
∑
i g¯i +N(0, σ
2C2I))
10: w˜t+1 = w˜t − rG˜B
11: end for
12: Return w˜T and accumulated privacy cost (, δ)
The parameter  denotes the privacy budget, which controls
the amount by which the distributions induced by D and D′
may differ. The parameter δ is a broken probability. Smaller
values of  and δ indicate stronger privacy guarantee).
Definition 2. Global sensitivity [Dwork et al., 2006]. Given
a query q: D → Rd, the global sensitivity ∆f is defined as
∆f = maxD,D′ |q(D)− q(D′)|.
The global sensitivity measures the maximum possible
change in q(D) when one record in the dataset changes.
The Gaussian mechanism with parameter σ adds Gaussian
noise N(0, σ2) to each component of the model output.
Definition 3. Gaussianmechanism [Dwork et al., 2006]. Let
 ∈ [0, 1] be arbitrary. For c2 > 2 log(1.25/δ), the Gaus-
sian mechanism with parameter σ > c∆f/ satisfies (, δ)-
differential privacy.
3.2 Differentially Private Stochastic Gradient
Descent
The procedure of deep learning model training is to minimize
the output of a loss function through numerous stochastic gra-
dient descent (SGD) steps. [Abadi et al., 2016] proposed a
differentially private SGD algorithm (DPSGD). DPSGD uses
a clipping bound on l2 norm of individual updates, aggregates
the clipped updates, and then adds Gaussian noise to the ag-
gregate. This ensures that the iterates do not overfit to any
individual user’s update.
The privacy leakage of DPSGD is measured by (, δ), i.e.,
computing a bound for the privacy loss  that holds with cer-
tain probability δ. Each iteration t of DPSGD can be consid-
ered as a privacy mechanism Mt that has the same pattern
in terms of sensitive data access. [Abadi et al., 2016] fur-
ther proposed a moment accounting mechanism which cal-
culates the aggregate privacy bound when performing SGD
for multiple steps. The moments accountant computes tighter
bounds for the privacy loss compared to the standard compo-
sition theorems. The moments accountant is tailored to the
Gaussian mechanism and employs the log moment of each
Mt to derive the bound of the total privacy loss.
To reduce noise in private training of neural networks,
DPSGD [Abadi et al., 2016] truncates the gradient of a neu-
ral network to control the sensitivity of the sum of gradients.
This is because the sensitivity of gradients and the scale of
the noise would otherwise be unbounded. To fix this, a cap
C on the maximum size of a user’s contribution is adopted
(Line 7 in Algorithm 1). This will bias our estimated sum
but also reduce the amount of added noise, as the sensitiv-
ity of the sum is now C. One question is how to choose the
truncation level for the gradient norm. If set too high, the
noise level may be so great that any utility in the result is lost.
If set too low, a large amount of gradients will be forced to
clip. DPSGD simply suggests using the median of observed
gradients. [Amin et al., 2019] investigated this bias-variance
trade-off and showed that the limit we should choose is the
(1 − 1/b)-quantile of the gradients themselves. It does not
matter how large or small the gradients are above or below
the cutoff, only that a fixed number of values are clipped.
3.3 Within-model Fairness
Consider the classifier η : A→ Y which predicts the class la-
bel Y given the unprotected attributes A. Classification fair-
ness requires that the predicted label η(A) is unbiased with
respect to the protected variable S. The following notions of
fairness in classification was defined by [Hardt et al., 2016]
and refined by [Beutel et al., 2017].
Definition 4. Demographic parity Given a labeled dataset
D and a classifier η : A → Y , the property of demographic
parity is defined as
P (η(A) = 1|S = i) = P (η(A) = 1|S = j).
This means that the predicted labels are independent of the
protected attribute.
Definition 5. Equality of odds Given a labeled dataset D
and a classifier η, the property of equality of odds is defined
as
P (η(A) = 1|Y = y, S = i) = P (η(A) = 1|Y = y, S = j),
where y ∈ {0, 1}.
Hence, for Y = 1, equality of odds requires the classifier
η has equal true positive rates (TPR) between two subgroups
S = i and S = j; for Y = 0, the classifier η has equal false
positive rates (FPR) between two subgroups.
Equality of odds promotes that individuals who qualify for
a desirable outcome should have an equal chance of being
correctly classified for this outcome. It allows for higher ac-
curacy with respect to non-discrimination. It enforces both
equal true positive rates and false positive rates in all demo-
graphics, punishing models that perform well only on the ma-
jority.
4 Disparate Impact on Model Accuracy
In this section, we first discuss how differentially private
learning, specifically DPSGD, causes inequality in utility loss
through our preliminary observations. Then we study the cost
of privacy with respect to each group in comparison with
the whole population and explain how group sample size is
related to the privacy impact on group accuracy along with
other factors.
4.1 Preliminary Observations
To explain why DPSGD has disparate impact on model accu-
racy w.r.t. each group, [Bagdasaryan et al., 2019] constructs
an unbalanced MNIST dataset to study the effects of gradi-
ent clipping, noise addition, the size of the underrepresented
group, batch size, length of training, and other hyperparame-
ters. Training on the data of the underrepresented subgroups
produces larger gradients, thus clipping reduces their learn-
ing rate and the influence of their data on the model. They
also showed random noise addition has the biggest impact on
the underrepresented inputs. However, [Jaiswal and Provost,
2019] reports inconsistent observations on whether differen-
tial privacy has negative discrimination towards the under-
represented group in terms of reduction in accuracy. To com-
plement their observations, we use the unbalanced MNIST
dataset used in in [Bagdasaryan et al., 2019] to reproduce
their result, and we also use two benchmark census datasets
(Adult and Dutch) in fair machine learning to study the in-
equality of utility loss due to differential privacy. We include
the setup details in Section 6.1. Table 1 shows the model ac-
curacy w.r.t. the total population, the majority group and the
minority group for SGD and DPSGD on the MNIST, Adult
and Dutch datasets.
For the unbalanced MNIST dataset, the minority group
(class 8) has significantly larger utility loss than the other
groups in private model. DPSGD only results in −7.07%
decrease in accuracy on the well-represented classes but ac-
curacy on the underrepresented class drops 68.07%, exhibit-
ing a disparate impact on the underrepresented class. Fig-
ure 1 shows that the small sample size reduces both the con-
vergence rate and the optimal utility of class 8 in DPSGD
in comparison with the non-private SGD. The model is far
from converging, yet clipping and noise addition do not let
it move closer to the minimum of the loss function. Fur-
thermore, the addition of noise whose magnitude is similar
to the update vector prevents the clipped gradients of the un-
derrepresented class from sufficiently updating the relevant
parts of the model. Training with more epochs does not re-
duce this gap while exhausting the privacy budget. Differen-
tial privacy also slows down the convergence and degrades
the utility for each group. Hence, DPSGD introduces nega-
tive discrimination against the minority group (which already
has lower accuracy in the non-private SGD model) on the un-
balanced MNIST dataset. This matches the observation in
[Bagdasaryan et al., 2019].
However, on the Adult and Dutch datasets, we have differ-
ent observations than MNIST. The Adult dataset is an unbal-
anced dataset, where the female group is underrepresented.
Even though the male group is the majority group, it has
lower accuracy in the SGD and more utility loss in DPSGD
than the female group. The Dutch dataset is a balanced
dataset, where the group sample sizes are similar for male and
female. However, DPSGD introduces more negative discrim-
ination against the male group and its direction (male group
loses more accuracy due to DP) is even opposite to the direc-
tion of within-model discrimination (female group has less
accuracy in SGD). Figure 2 shows that the average gradient
norm is much higher for the male group in DPSGD on both
datasets. It is not simply against the group with smaller sam-
Dataset MNIST Adult Dutch
Group Total Class 2 Class 8 Total M F Total M F
Sample size 54649 5958 500 45222 30527 14695 60420 30273 30147
SGD 0.9855 0.9903 0.9292 0.8099 0.7610 0.9117 0.7879 0.8013 0.7744
DPSGD 0.8774 0.9196 0.2485 0.7507 0.6870 0.8836 0.6878 0.6479 0.7278
DPSGD vs. SGD -0.1081 -0.0707 -0.6807 -0.0592 -0.0740 -0.0281 -0.1001 -0.1534 -0.0466
Table 1: Model accuracy w.r.t. the total population, the majority group and the minority group for SGD and DPSGD on the unbalanced
MNIST ( = 6.55, δ = 10−6), the original Adult ( = 3.1, δ = 10−6) and the original Dutch ( = 2.66, δ = 10−6) datasets
Figure 1: The average gradient norm and the average loss w.r.t. class 2 and 8 over epochs for SGD and DPSGD on the MNIST dataset
(Balanced:  = 6.23, δ = 10−6, Unbalanced:  = 6.55, δ = 10−6)
Figure 2: The average gradient norm and the average loss w.r.t. male and female groups over epochs for SGD and DPSGD on the original
Adult and the original Dutch datasets (Adult:  = 3.1, δ = 10−6, Dutch:  = 2.66, δ = 10−6)
ple size or lower accuracy in the SGD. Hence, differential pri-
vacy does not always introduce more accuracy loss to the mi-
nority group on the Adult and Dutch datasets. This matches
the observation in [Jaiswal and Provost, 2019].
From the preliminary observations, we learn that the dis-
proportionate effect from differential privacy is not guaran-
teed towards the underrepresented group or the group with
“poor” accuracy. Why does differential privacy cause in-
equality in utility loss w.r.t. each group? It may depend on
more than just the represented sample size of each group: the
classification model, the mechanism to achieve differential
privacy, the relative complexity of data distribution of each
group subject to the model. One common observation among
all settings is that the group that incurs more utility loss has
larger gradients and worse convergence. In Figure 1, the un-
derrepresented class 8 has average gradient norm of over 100
and bad utility in DPSGD. In Figure 2, the male group has
much larger average gradient norm than the female group in
DPSGD on both Adult and Dutch datasets. It is important to
address the larger gradients and worse convergence directly
in order to mitigate the inequality in utility loss.
4.2 Analysis on Cost of Privacy w.r.t. Each Group
In this section, we conduct analysis on the cost of privacy
from the viewpoint of a single batch, where the utility loss is
measured by the expected error of the estimated private gra-
dient w.r.t. each group. Our analysis follows [Amin et al.,
2019] that investigates the bias-variance trade-off due to clip-
ping in DPSGD. Suppose that Bt is a collection of b samples,
x1, · · · , xb. Each xi corresponds to a sample and generates
the gradient gi. We would like to estimate the average gra-
dient GB from Bt in a differentially private way while mini-
mizing the objective function.
Based on Algorithm 1, we denote the original gradient be-
fore clipping GB = 1b
∑b
i=1 gi (in Line 4), the gradient af-
ter clipping but before adding noise G¯B = 1b
∑b
i=1 g¯i (in
Line 7), and the gradient after clipping and adding noise
G˜B =
1
b (
∑b
i=1 g¯i + N(0, C
2I)) (in Line 9). The expected
error of the estimate G˜B consists of a variance term (due to
the noise) and a bias term (due to the contribution limit):
E|G˜B −GB | ≤ E|G˜B − G¯B |+ |G¯B −GB |
≤ 1
b
C

+
1
b
b∑
i=1
max(0, |gi| − C).
In the above derivation, we base the fact that the mean abso-
lute deviation of a Laplace variable is equal to its scale param-
eter. We can find the optimal C by noting that the bound is
convex with sub-derivative 1 − |{i : gi > C}|, thus the mini-
mum is achieved when C is equal to the d1/eth largest value
in gradients.
The expected error is tight as we have
E|G˜B −GB | ≥ 1
2
[
1
b
C

+
1
b
b∑
i=1
max(0, |gi| − C)
]
.
In other words, the limit we should choose is just the
(1− 1/b)-quantile of the gradients themselves.
For the same batch of samples, we derive the cost of pri-
vacy w.r.t. each group. Suppose the batch of samples Bt are
from K groups and group k has sample size bk. We have
GkB =
1
bk
∑bk
i=1 g
k
i and GB =
1
b
∑K
k=1 b
kGkB .
DPSGD bounds the sensitivity of gradient by clipping each
sample’s gradient with a clipping bound C.
G¯kB =
1
bk
bk∑
i=1
g¯ki =
1
bk
bk∑
i=1
gki ×min(1,
C
|gki |
).
Then, DPSGD adds Gaussian noise on the sum of clipped
gradients.
G˜kB =
1
bk
(bkG¯kB +N(0, C
2I)).
The expected error of the estimate G˜kB also consists of a
variance term (due to the noise) and a bias term (due to the
contribution limit):
E|G˜kB −GkB | ≤ E|G˜kB − G¯kB |+ |G¯kB −GkB |
≤ 1
bk
C

+
1
bk
bk∑
i
max(0, |gki | − C)
≤ 1
bk
C

+
1
bk
mk∑
i
(|gki | − C),
(1)
where mk = |{i : |gki | > C}| is the number of exam-
ples that get clipped in group k. Similarly, we can get
the tight bound w.r.t. each group k is E|G˜kB − GkB | ≥
1
2
[
1
bk
C
 +
1
bk
∑bk
i max(0, |gki | − C)
]
.
From Equation 1, we know the utility loss of group k, mea-
sured by the expected error of the estimated private gradient,
is bounded by two terms, the bias 1
bk
∑bk
i max(0, |gki | − C)
due to contribution limit (depending on the size of gradients
and the size of clipping bound) and the variance of the noise
1
bk
C
 (depending on the scale of the noise). Next, we discuss
their separate impacts in DPSGD.
Given the clipping bound C, the bias due to clipping w.r.t.
the group with large gradients is larger than the one w.r.t. the
group with small gradients. Before clipping, the group with
large gradients has large contribution in the total gradient GB
in SGD, but it is not the case in DPSGD. The direction of
the total gradient after clipping G¯B is closer to the direction
of the gradient of the group with small bias (small gradients)
in comparison with the direction of the total gradient before
clipping GB . Due to clipping, the contribution and conver-
gence of the group with large gradients are reduced.
The added noise increases the variance of the model gra-
dient as it tries to hide the influence of a single record on
the model. It slows down the convergence rate of the model.
Because the noise scalesC and the sensitivity of clipped gra-
dients C are the same for all groups, the noisy gradients of all
groups achieve the same level of differential privacy . The
direction of the noise is random, i.e. it does not favor a par-
ticular group in expectation.
Overall in DPSGD, the group with large gradients has
larger cost of privacy, i.e. they have more utility loss to
achieve  level of differential privacy under the same clipping
bound C.
We can also consider the optimal choice ofC which is (1−
1
b )-quantile for the whole batch. For each group, the optimal
choice of Ck is (1− 1
bk
)-quantile for group k. The distance
between C and Ck is not the same for all groups, and C is
closer to the choice ofCk for the group with small bias (small
gradients).
Now we look back on the preliminary observations in Sec-
tion 4.1. On MNIST, the group sample size affects the con-
vergence rate for each group. The group with large sample
size (the majority group, class 2) has larger contribution in
the total gradient than the group with small sample size (the
minority group, class 8), and therefore it leads to a relatively
faster and better convergence. As the result, the gradients of
the minority group are larger than the gradients of the ma-
jority group later on. In their case, the small sample size is
the main cause of large gradient norm and large utility loss
in class 8. On Adult and Dutch, the average bias due to clip-
ping for each group is different because the distributions of
gradients are quite different. The average gradient norm of
the male group is larger than the average gradient norm of the
female group, even though the male group is not underrepre-
sented. As the result, the male group’s contribution is limited
due to clipping and it has larger utility loss in DPSGD. In
there case, the group sample size is not the only reason to
cause difference in the average gradient norm, and the other
factors (e.g., the relative complexity of data distribution of
each group subject to the model) out-weighs sample size, so
the well-represented male group has larger utility loss.
This gives us an insight on the relation between differential
privacy and the inequality in utility loss w.r.t. each group. The
direct cause of the inequality is the large cost of privacy due
to large average gradient norm (which can be caused by small
group sample size along with other factors). In DPSGD, the
clipping bound is selected uniformly for each group without
consideration of the difference in clipping biases. As a re-
sult, the noise addition to achieve (, δ)-differential privacy
on the learning model results in different utility-privacy trade-
off for each group, where the underrepresented or the more
complex group incurs a larger utility loss. After all, DPSGD
is designed to protect individual’s privacy with nice proper-
ties without consideration of its different impact towards each
group. In order to avoid disparate utility loss among groups,
we need to modify DPSGD such that each group needs to
achieve different level of privacy to counter their difference
in costs of privacy.
5 Removing Disparate Impact
Our objective is to build a learning algorithm that outputs
a neural network classifier η˜(a; w˜) with parameter w˜ that
achieves differential privacy and equality of utility loss with
satisfactory utility. Based on our preliminary observation and
analysis on cost of privacy in DPSGD, we propose a heuris-
tic removal algorithm to achieve equal utility loss w.r.t. each
group, called DPSGD-F.
Algorithm 2 DPSGD-F (Dataset D, loss function LD(w),
learning rate r, batch size b, noise scale σ, base clipping
bound C0)
1: for t ∈ [T ] do
2: Randomly sample a batch of samples Bt(|Bt| = b)
from D
3: for each sample xi ∈ Bt do
4: gi = OLi(wt)
5: end for
6: m = |{i : |gi| > C0}|
7: for each group k ∈ [K] do
8: mk = |{i : |gki | > C0}|
9: Ck = C0 × (1 + m
k/bk
m/b )
10: end for
11: for each sample xi ∈ Bt do
12: g¯i = gi ×min(1, Ck|gi| )
13: end for
14: C = max
k
Ck
15: G˜B =
1
b (
∑
i g¯i +N(0, σ
2C2I))
16: w˜t+1 = w˜t − rG˜B
17: end for
18: Return w˜T and accumulated privacy cost (, δ)
5.1 Equality of Impact of Differential Privacy
In within-model fairness, equality of odds results in the equal-
ity of accuracy for different groups. Note that equal accuracy
does not result in equal odds. As a trade-off for privacy, dif-
ferential privacy results in accuracy loss on the model. How-
ever, different groups may incur different levels of accuracy
loss. We use reduction in accuracy w.r.t. group k to mea-
sure utility loss between the private model η˜ and the non-
privacte model η, denoted by ∆k. We define a new fairness
notion called equality of privacy impact for differentially pri-
vate learning, which requires the group utility loss due to dif-
ferential privacy should be the same for all groups.
Definition 6. Equality of privacy impact Given a labeled
dataset D, a classifier η and a differentially private classi-
fier η˜, a differentially private mechanism satisfies equality of
privacy impact if
∆i(η˜ − η) = ∆j(η˜ − η),
where i, j are any two values of the protected attribute S.
5.2 Removal Algorithm
We propose a heuristic approach for differentially private
SGD that removes disparate impact across different groups.
The intuition of our heuristic approach is to balance the level
of privacy w.r.t. each group based on their utility-privacy
trade-off. Algorithm 2 shows the framework of our approach.
Instead of uniformly clipping the gradients for all groups, we
propose to do adaptive sensitive clipping where each group
k gets its own clipping bound Ck. For the group with larger
clipping bias (due to large gradients), we choose a larger clip-
ping bound to balance their higher cost of privacy. The large
gradients may be due to group sample size or other factors.
Based on our observation and analysis in the previous sec-
tion, to balance the difference in costs of privacy for each
group, we need to adjust the clipping bound Ck such that the
contribution of each group is proportional to the size of their
average gradient. Ideally, we would like to adjust the clipping
bound based on the private estimate of the average gradient
norm. However, the original gradient before clipping has un-
bounded sensitivity. It would not be practical to get its private
estimate. We need to construct a good approximate estimate
of the relative size of the average gradient w.r.t. each group
and it needs to have a small sensitivity for private estimation.
In our algorithm, we choose adaptive clipping bound Ck
based on the mk, where mk = |{i : |gki | > C0}|. To avoid
the influence of group sample size, we use the fraction of
mk
bk
that represents the fraction of samples in the group with
gradients larger than C0. The relative ratio of m
k
bk
and mb
can approximately represent the relative size of the average
gradient. Both mk and bk have sensitivity of 1, which is
much smaller than the sensitivity of the actual gradients. Note
that in Algorithm 2 we do not attempt to choose the clipping
bound Ck for group k in a differentially private way. We can
easily use a small privacy budget to get bk,mk in a differen-
tially private way.
After the adaptive clipping, the sensitivity of the clipped
gradient of group k is Ck = C0 × (1 + m
k/bk
m/b ). The sensi-
tivity of the clipped gradient of the total population would be
maxk C
k as the worst case in the total population needs to be
considered.
For the total population, Algorithm 2 still satisfies (, δ)-
differential privacy as it accounts for the worst clipping bound
max
k
Ck. For the group level, each group achieves different
levels of privacy depending on their utility-privacy trade-off.
In the case of [Bagdasaryan et al., 2019], the difference
in gradient norms is primarily decided by group sample size.
Consider a majority group s+ and a minority group s−. In Al-
gorithm 1, each group achieves the same level of privacy, but
the underrepresented group s− has higher privacy cost (util-
ity loss). In Algorithm 2, we choose a higher clipping bound
C− for the underrepresented group. Because the noise scale
is C =
C−
 and the sensitivity of clipped gradients for the
underrepresented group is C−, the noisy gradient w.r.t. the
underrepresented group achieves -differential privacy. The
well-represented group s+ has a smaller cost of privacy, so we
choose a lower clipping bound C+. Because the noise scale
is C =
C−
 and the sensitivity of clipped gradients for the
underrepresented group is C+, the noisy gradient w.r.t. the
underrepresented group then achieves C
+
C− -differential pri-
vacy. Two groups have different clipping bounds C+, C−
and the same noise addition based on C = max(C+, C−)
(same  but different relative scales w.r.t. their group sensitiv-
ities). Hence, when we enforce the same level of utility loss
for groups with different sample sizes, the well-represented
group achieves stronger privacy (smaller than ) than the un-
derrepresented group.
In the case of Adult/Dutch, the male group has larger gra-
dients regardless of the sample size. The group with smaller
Algorithm 3 Naı¨ve (Dataset D, loss function LD(w), learn-
ing rate r, batch size b, noise scale σ, base clipping bound
C0)
1: for t ∈ [T ] do
2: Randomly sample a batch of samples Bt(|Bt| = b)
from D
3: for each sample xi ∈ Bt do
4: gi = OLi(wt)
5: end for
6: for each group k ∈ [K] do
7: θk = 1× b/K
bk
8: end for
9: for each sample xi ∈ Bt do
10: g¯i = θk × gi ×min(1, C0|gi| )
11: end for
12: C = C0 ×max
k
θk
13: G˜B =
1
b (
∑
i g¯
′
i +N(0, σ
2C2I))
14: w˜t+1 = w˜t − rG˜B
15: end for
16: Return w˜T and accumulated privacy cost (, δ)
gradients based on model and data distribution has smaller
cost of privacy. Algorithm 2 can adjust the clipping bound
for each group. As a result, the group with smaller gradients
achieves stronger level of privacy. Eventually, they can have
similar clipping bias than the ones in Algorithm 1.
5.3 Baseline
There is no previous work on how to achieve equal utility
loss in DPSGD. For experimental evaluation, we also present
a naı¨ve baseline algorithm based on reweighting (shown as
Algorithm 3) in this section. The naı¨ve algorithm considers
group sample size as the main cause of disproportional impact
in DPSGD and adjusts sample contribution of each group to
mitigate the impact of sample size.
For the group with larger group sample size, we reweight
the sample contribution with θk ∝ 1
bk
instead of using uni-
form weight of 1 for all groups. (Note thatGB in Algorithm 1
is estimated based on uniform weight of each sample regard-
less of their group membership.) The sensitivity for group k
is Ck = C0 × ( b/Kbk ). The sensitivity for the total population
would be maxk Ck. The result also matches the idea that we
limit the sample contribution of the group with smaller cost
of privacy to achieve stronger privacy level w.r.t. the group.
However, Naı¨ve only considers the group sample size. As we
know, the factors that affect the gradient norm and bias due
to clipping are more complex than just the group sample size.
We will compare with this Naı¨ve approach as a baseline in
our experiments.
6 Experiments
6.1 Experiment Setup
Datasets
We use MNIST dataset and replicate the setting in [Bag-
dasaryan et al., 2019]. The original MNIST dataset is a bal-
anced dataset with 60,000 training samples and each class has
about 6,000 samples. Class 8 has the most false negatives,
hence we choose it as the artificially underrepresented group
(reducing the number of training samples from 5,851 to 500)
in the unbalanced MNIST dataset. We compare the underrep-
resented class 8 with the well-represented class 2 that shares
fewest false negatives with the class 8 and therefore can be
considered independent. The testing dataset has 10,000 test-
ing samples with about 1,000 for each class.
We also use two census datasets, Adult and Dutch. For
both datasets, we consider “Sex” as the protected attribute
and “Income” as decision. For unprotected attributes, we
convert categorical attributes to one-hot vectors and normal-
ize numerical attributes to [0, 1] range. After preprocessing,
we have 40 unprotected attributes for Adult and 35 unpro-
tected attributes for Dutch. The original Adult dataset has
45,222 samples (30,527 males and 14,695 females). We sam-
ple a balanced Adult dataset with 14,000 males and 14,000
females. The original Dutch dataset is close to balanced with
30,273 males and 30,147 females. We sample an unbalanced
Dutch dataset with 30,000 males and 10,000 females. In all
settings, we split the census datasets into 80% training data
and 20% testing data.
Model
For the MNIST dataset, we use a neural network with 2 con-
volutional layers and 2 linear layers with 431K parameters in
total. We use learning rate r = 0.01, batch size b = 256, and
the number of training epochs T = 60.
For the census datasets, we use a logistic regression model
with regularization parameter 0.01. We use learning rate r =
1/
√
T , batch size b = 256, and the number of training epochs
T = 20.
Baseline
We compare our proposed method DPSGD-F (Algorithm 2)
with the original DPSGD (Algorithm 1) and the Naı¨ve ap-
proach (Algorithm 3). For each setting, the learning param-
eters are the same. We set C0 in DPSGD-F and Naı¨ve equal
to C in DPSGD. For the MNIST dataset, we set noise scale
σ = 0.8, clipping bound C = 1, and δ = 10−6. For the
census datasets, we set noise scale σ = 1, clipping bound
C = 0.5, and δ = 10−6. The accumulated privacy budget 
for each setting is computed using the privacy moments ac-
counting method [Abadi et al., 2016]. All DP models are
compared with the non-private SGD when we measure the
utility loss due to differential privacy.
Metric
We use the test data to measure the model utility and fairness.
Based on Definition 6, we use reduction in model accuracy
for each group between the private SGD and the non-private
SGD (∆k) as the metric to measure the impact of differential
privacy w.r.t. each group. The difference between the im-
pacts on groups (∆i −∆j for any i, j) measures the level of
inequality in utility loss due to differential privacy. If the im-
pacts for all groups are independent of the protected attribute
(∆i − ∆j ≈ 0 for any i, j), we consider the private SGD
has equal reduction in model accuracy w.r.t. each group, i.e.
the private SGD achieves equality of impact of differential
privacy. We also report the average loss and average gradi-
ent norm to show the convergence w.r.t. each group during
training.
6.2 MNIST Dataset
Table 2 shows the model accuracy w.r.t. class 2 and 8 on the
balanced and unbalanced MNIST datasets. Figure 3 shows
the model accuracy w.r.t. all classes on the MNIST dataset.
On the balanced dataset, each private or non-private model
achieves similar accuracy across all groups. When we arti-
ficially reduce the sample size of class 8, class 8 becomes
the minority group in the unbalanced dataset. The non-
private SGD model converges to 92.92% accuracy on class
8 vs. 99.03% accuracy on class 2. The DPSGD model
causes 68.07% accuracy loss on class 8 vs. 7.07% on class
2, which exhibits a significant disparate impact on the un-
derrepresented class. The Naı¨ve approach achieves 12.92%
accuracy loss on class 8 vs. 19.32% on class 2, which over-
corrects the disparate impact on the underrepresented class.
Our DPSGD-F algorithm has 4.32% accuracy loss on class 8
vs. 4.56% on class 2, which achieves equal impact. The total
model accuracy also drops less for DPSGD-F (−3.20%) than
the original DPSGD (−10.81%).
Figure 4 shows the average gradient norm and the average
loss w.r.t. class 2 and 8 for SGD and different DP models.
In DPSGD, the average gradient norm for class 8 is over 100
and the average loss for class 8 is 2.16. Whereas, in DPSGD-
F, the average gradient norm for class 8 is only 2.62 and the
average loss for class 8 is only 0.42. The convergence loss
and the gradient norm for class 8 are much closer to the ones
for class 2 in DPSGD-F. It shows our adjusted clipping bound
helps to achieve the same group utility loss regardless of the
group sample size.
Figure 5 shows how our adaptive clipping bound changes
over epochs in DPSGD-F. Because class 8 has larger clipping
bias due to its underrepresented group sample size, DPSGD-
F gives class 8 a higher clipping bound to increase its sample
contribution in the total gradient. The maximal Ck is close
to 3. To show that the fair performance of DPSGD-F is not
caused by increasing clipping bound uniformly, we run the
original DPSGD with increasing clipping bound from C = 1
to C = 5. Table 3 shows the level of inequality in utility loss
for different clipping bound in DPSGD vs. the adaptive clip-
ping bound in DPSGD-F. Even though increasing clipping
bound C in DPSGD can improve the accuracy on class 8,
there is still significant difference between the accuracy loss
on class 8 (−10.99% when C = 5) and the accuracy loss on
class 2 (−1.45% when C = 5). This is because the utility-
privacy trade-offs are different for the minority group and the
majority group under the same clipping bound. So the in-
equality in utility loss cannot be removed by simply increas-
ing the clipping bound in DPSGD. On contrast, DPSGD-F
achieves equal impact on model accuracy by adjusting the
clipping bound for each group according to the utility-privacy
trade-off. The group with smaller cost of privacy achieves a
stronger level of privacy as a result of adaptive clipping.
(a) Balanced:  = 6.23, δ = 10−6 (b) Unbalanced:  = 6.55, δ = 10−6
Figure 3: Model accuracy w.r.t. each class for SGD, DPSGD, Naı¨ve and DPSGD-F on the MNIST dataset
Figure 4: The average gradient norm and the average loss w.r.t. class 2 and 8 over epochs for SGD, DPSGD, Naı¨ve and DPSGD-F on the
unbalanced MNIST dataset ( = 6.55, δ = 10−6)
Dataset Balanced Unbalanced
Group Total Class 2 Class 8 Total Class 2 Class 8
Sample size 60000 5958 5851 54649 5958 500
SGD 0.9892 0.9932 0.9917 0.9855 0.9903 0.9292
DPSGD vs. SGD -0.0494 -0.0853 -0.0719 -0.1081 -0.0707 -0.6807
Naı¨ve vs. SGD -0.0484 -0.0823 -0.0657 -0.1268 -0.1932 -0.1292
DPSGD-F vs. SGD -0.0267 -0.0387 -0.0401 -0.0320 -0.0456 -0.0432
Table 2: Model accuracy w.r.t. class 2 and 8 on the MNIST dataset (Balanced:  = 6.23, δ = 10−6, Unbalanced:  = 6.55, δ = 10−6)
Figure 5: The clipping bound Ck w.r.t. each class over epochs for
DPSGD-F on the unbalanced MNIST dataset ( = 6.55, δ = 10−6)
Group Total Class 2 Class 8
Sample size 54649 5958 500
SGD 0.9855 0.9903 0.9292
DPSGD (C = 1) vs. SGD -0.1081 -0.0707 -0.6807
DPSGD (C = 2) vs. SGD -0.0587 -0.0426 -0.3286
DPSGD (C = 3) vs. SGD -0.0390 -0.0232 -0.2013
DPSGD (C = 4) vs. SGD -0.0286 -0.0194 -0.1376
DPSGD (C = 5) vs. SGD -0.0240 -0.0145 -0.1099
DPSGD-F (C0 = 1) vs. SGD -0.0320 -0.0456 -0.0432
Table 3: Model accuracy w.r.t. class 2 and 8 for different uniform
clipping bound (C = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) in DPSGD vs. adaptive clipping
bound (C0 = 1) in DPSGD-F on the unbalanced MNIST dataset
( = 6.55, δ = 10−6)
6.3 Adult and Dutch Datasets
Table 4 shows the model accuracy w.r.t. male and female on
the balanced and unbalanced Adult and Dutch datasets. The
clipping biases for both census datasets are not primarily de-
cided by group sample size. We observe disparate impact on
DPSGD in comparison to SGD against the male group, even
though the male group is not underrepresented. The Naı¨ve
approach does not work at all in this case, as the importance
of group sample size is not as much as in the MNIST dataset.
There are still other factors that affect the gradient norm and
the clipping bias w.r.t. each group. DPSGD-F can achieve
similar accuracy loss for male and female in all four settings.
It shows the effectiveness of our approach.
Figure 6 shows the average gradient norm and the average
loss w.r.t. male and female for SGD and different DP models
on the unbalanced Adult. In DPSGD, the average gradient
norm for male is 5 times of the one in SGD and the average
loss for male is 50% more than the one in SGD. Whereas,
in DPSGD-F, the average gradient norm and the average loss
for the male group are much closer to the ones in SGD. Fig-
ure 7 shows the average gradient norm and the average loss
w.r.t. male and female in SGD and different DP models on
the unbalanced Dutch dataset. Similar to the result for Adult
dataset, in DPSGD-F, the average gradient norm and the av-
erage loss for the male group are much closer to the ones in
SGD. It shows our adjusted clipping bound helps to achieve
the same group utility loss regardless of the sample size.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
Gradient clipping and random noise addition, which are the
core techniques in differentially private SGD, disproportion-
ately affect underrepresented and complex classes and sub-
groups. As a consequence, DPSGD has disparate impact:
the accuracy of a model trained using DPSGD tends to de-
crease more on these classes and subgroups vs. the origi-
nal, non-private model. If the original model is unfair in the
sense that its accuracy is not the same across all subgroups,
DPSGD exacerbates this unfairness. In this work, we pro-
pose DPSGD-F to remove the potential disparate impact of
differential privacy on the protected group. DPSGD-F ad-
justs the contribution of samples in a group depending on the
group clipping bias such that differential privacy has no dis-
parate impact on group utility. Our experimental evaluation
shows how group sample size and group clipping bias affect
the impact of differential privacy in DPSGD, and how adap-
tive clipping for each group helps to mitigate the disparate
impact caused by differential privacy in DPSGD-F. Gradient
clipping in the non-private context may improve the model
robustness against outliers. However, examples in the mi-
nority group are not outliers. They should not be ignored
by the (private) learning model. In future work, we can fur-
ther improve our adaptive clipping method from group-wise
adaptive clipping to element-wise (from user and/or parame-
ter perspectives) adaptive clipping, so the model can be fair
even to the unseen minority class.
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Dataset Balanced Adult Unbalanced Adult Balanced Dutch Unbalanced Dutch
Group Total M F Total M F Total M F Total M F
Sample size 28000 14000 14000 45222 30527 14695 60420 30273 30147 40000 30000 10000
SGD 0.824 0.748 0.899 0.809 0.761 0.911 0.787 0.801 0.774 0.802 0.834 0.706
DPSGD vs. SGD -0.036 -0.054 -0.019 -0.059 -0.074 -0.028 -0.100 -0.153 -0.046 -0.124 -0.086 -0.240
Naı¨ve vs. SGD -0.036 -0.054 -0.019 -0.059 -0.073 -0.028 -0.101 -0.155 -0.046 -0.093 -0.129 0.016
DPSGD-F vs. SGD -0.005 -0.010 -0.001 -0.010 -0.009 -0.013 -0.004 -0.005 -0.003 -0.017 -0.017 -0.020
Table 4: Model accuracy w.r.t. the total population and each group on the Adult and Dutch datasets ( Balanced Adult (sampled):  =
3.99, δ = 10−6, Unbalanced Adult (original):  = 3.1, δ = 10−6, Balanced Dutch (original):  = 2.66, δ = 10−6, Unbalanced Dutch
(sampled):  = 3.29, δ = 10−6)
Figure 6: The average gradient norm and the average loss w.r.t. each group over epochs for SGD, DPSGD, Naı¨ve and DPSGD-F on the
unbalanced Adult dataset ( = 3.1, δ = 10−6)
Figure 7: The average gradient norm and the average loss w.r.t. each group over epochs for SGD, DPSGD, Naı¨ve and DPSGD-F on the
unbalanced Dutch dataset ( = 3.29, δ = 10−6)
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